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THE IMPACT ON STANDING DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION OF THE INJURY IN FACT REQUIREMENT IN
LuJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
TIMOTHY BELEVETZ*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty years, the burden of enforcing public law has
fallen increasingly upon the shoulders of private individuals. It might be
more accurate to say that private individuals have the opportunity, rather
than burden, to enforce public law, for many individuals and organizations
have used statutory rights to sue as a means of attaining their public
objectives. Private enforcers have sought to enforce the law in areas
ranging from consumer protection to civil rights to antitrust and securities
exchange.! The largest area of development of private enforcement,
however, has been environmental law.
While the primary purpose of environmental citizen suits, and
public interest litigation in general, is to vindicate important public rights,
courts nevertheless require private plaintiffs to demonstrate sufficient
standing to sue. While standing doctrine has been developing for decades,
only since the early 1970s have courts faced the difficult task of defining
the limits of standing in environmental litigation. Although many of the
statutory provisions enabling a private citizen to sue contain language such
as "any citizen" or "any person," courts still must answer such questions
as whether the plaintiff sustained an actual injury, whether the law invoked
actually protects the alleged injury, and whether an adequate nexus
between the injury sustained and the conduct challenged exists.
In Lujan v. NationalWildlife Federation,the United States Supreme
Court heard a case in which a private plaintiff challenged land
management practices in vast portions of federally owned land.2 The
Court held that by claiming use and enjoyment of land "in the vicinity" of
the affected areas, the plaintiff did not allege an actual injury sufficient to
* B.A. Amherst College, 1989; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William

and Mary, expected 1993.
1. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988); Civil Rights

Act of 1964 §§ 706(0, 2004(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000e-5(f) (1988); Clayton Act
of 1964 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); Securities Act of 1933 §11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1988).
2. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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withstand the defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 Does the
decision contribute to standing jurisprudence, or simply provide procedural
instruction as to the best method of drafting a complaint and supporting
affidavits?
This Article will trace the development of private enforcement of
public law with an emphasis on environmental citizen suit provisions. It
will then provide a foundation for understanding the constitutional and
prudential requirements for standing, specifically examining standing
doctrine in pre-National Wildlife Federation environmental private
enforcement actions. After describing the holding in National Wildlife
Federation,the Article will analyze the decision's impact on environmental
citizen suit litigation and argue that the case's contribution to standing is
insubstantial. The main lessons to be drawn from National Wildlife
Federation are (1) plaintiffs must be more careful and artful in drafting
their complaints and supporting affidavits in cases involving use and
enjoyment of land areas, and (2) in challenging standing in such cases,
defendants would be wise to employ a motion for summary judgment
rather than a motion to dismiss.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although the popularity of statutory citizen suit litigation is a
relatively recent phenomenon, private enforcement of public law is not a
new idea. The modem citizen suit has an assortment of historical and
modern predecessors. Marbury v. Madison involved citizen-initiated
judicial review of an agency action.4 In the Anglo-American tradition, the
notion of joint public and private responsibility of enforcement reaches
back at least 600 years to when Richard II and the English Parliament
enacted a water pollution statute. 5 Public officials or anyone else who
"fe[It] [themselves] grieved" or who "w[ould] complain" could bring
enforcement actions under this statute. 6
The English common law system had two different legal devices
that enabled private citizens to take part in enforcement. A citizen could

3. Id. at 899.
4. 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 12 Rich. II, ch. 12 (1388).
6. Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, PrivatizingRegulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under FederalEnvironmental Laws, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 833,

947 (1985), quoting 12 Rich. II, ch. 13 (1388).
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institute either a qui tam action' or a public nuisance tort action. Because
no rigid conceptual distinction between public and private functions
existed, citizen suits were not uncommon in England.8 Such a distinction
did not develop until the advent of the industrial revolution toward the end
of the nineteenth century. As industries and urban centers began to grow,
so did the need for new regulations which increased in number and in
scope. Because of limited resources, however, the Parliament enacted
common informer statutes which sought to enlist the help of private
citizens with the arduous task of enforcement. 9 These statutes permitted
actions for a broad range of offenses including violation of health and
safety standards in the workplace, licensing requirements for professional
occupations, and "Offenses leading to the Corruption of Morals." 10
As industrialization progressed, society became more complex and
government more centralized. The notion of governmental responsibility
for the welfare of citizens became firmly entrenched. Although private
parties sued to protect their property and economic interests from other
private parties and from the government, judicial review was not seen as
a device for citizen-initiated challenge of actions affecting common public
resources.

11

The first half of the twentieth century saw the enactment of several
statutes providing for judicial review of administrative agency action in the
United States. In 1946 Congress codified the citizen's right to such review
in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 12 The APA provides that,
"A person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of [the]
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."' 3 Other regulatory
legislation identified in specific provisions the parties entitled to petition
for review. The statutory language included such terms as "party in

7. "Qui tam" is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
si ipso in hac parte sequitur" which means "who sues on behalf of the King as well as
himself."

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).

8. Boyer and Meidinger, supra note 6, at 952.
9. Under the common informer statutes, parties assisting in the arrest and conviction of
violaters would receive a share of the fines collected as a result of their efforts. 2 LEON
RADINOzWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM
1750 at 138 (1956).
10. Id. at 142.
11. MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SunTs § 1-2 (1991).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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interest '' 4 or any person15 or party "aggrieved"' 6 or "adversely
7
affected."
In 1943, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Associated
Industies of New York, Inc., v. Ickes held that "[C]ongress can
constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person ...
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his
statutory powers . .1.8."" The court concluded that in such cases the
constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy" is satisfied, even if
the plaintiff's sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.' 9 The
controversy arises from the private citizen's right to live in a society in
which public officers do not act in violation of their statutory powers. 20
The court invented the term "private attorneys general" to describe such
plaintiffs who sue to enforce public legislation.1
In Associated
Industries, however, the private attorney generals, industrial coal
consumers who claimed a common economic interest in the
implementation of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, sought judicial
protection of only their economic interest in rights or resources, rather than
their public interest in preserving those rights and resources.2 2
Before 1970, the year Congress amended the Clean Air Act 23 to
include a citizen suit provision, citizens' attempts to seek judicial
protection of public non-economic rights were sporadic.' The growth of
14. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 205,49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1976), repealed by 92
Stat. 1466 (1978), granting a "party in interest" standing to maintain an action to set aside

an Interstate Commerce Commission order.
15. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 902(m) (1946), repealed by

70A Stat. 641 (1956), authorizing "any person who is aggrieved by the denial.., of his
protest" against an order of the Price Administrator prohibiting a landlord from evicting
a tenant, upon complaint to the Emergency Court of Appeals, to secure judicial review
of the Administrator's denial of such protest.
16. See, e.g., Hatch Political Activity Act § 906(a)(6), 5 U.S.C. § 1508 (1988) entitling
"any party aggrieved by a determination or order of the Merit Systems Protection Board
to file a petition for review.
17. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(e)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(2)
(1988), permitting any person "adversely affected" by a regulation of the Federal Security
Administrator, to seek a public hearing.
18. 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d. Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 697-98.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
24. AXLINE, supra note 11, § 1-3.
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the civil rights movement, activism concerning the Vietnam War, and an
increasing awareness of the deterioration of the environment led private
individuals and organizations to the courtroom to seek an end to unlawful
conduct, including conduct which resulted in public and non-economic
harm.' The Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of citizen suits to
protect non-economic public rights in NAACP v. Buiton.2' The Court
found that litigation in the context of the objectives of organizations like
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
constitutes a form of political expression. 27 Such litigation is "not a
technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state,
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country."28
The incorporation in 1966 of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governing class actions caused an upsurge in the filing of
actions seeking environmental protection and enforcement of corporate
democracy and consumers' rights. 9 Although availability of the class
action was strictly limited to those who actually had a cause of action,
federal statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 196430 and the Voting Rights
Ace' provided causes of action for large numbers of victims of
discrimination.32 The class action enabled plaintiffs who did not have the
financial resources to sue as individuals to aggregate their claims in a
class-wide suit. In so doing, the efforts of individual plaintiffs benefitted
a greater number of people.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUIT CLAUSES

In the late 1960s private citizens attempted to protect shared
environmental resources through cumbersome and often unsuccessful
means. Qui tam and public nuisance actions against dischargers who
polluted common air and waters either met with disfavor in the courts or
faced enormous obstacles. 3 With few incentives for prosecution, most

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Id. at 429.
Id.
AXIN E, supra note 11, § 1-3 to 1-4.
28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988); 42 U.S.C §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988).
AXLMhJE, supra note 11, § 1-4.
Id.
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people found that the costs of litigating outweighed the benefits.
In response to these obstacles and to a growing interest in
environmental protection, Congress significantly enhanced enforcement
devices in the federal environmental statutes."
Citizen suit clauses
developed in an effort to stimulate government enforcement. Senator
Edmund Muskie stated during the Senate debate on the amendments to the
Clean Air Act of 1970"5 that the proposed citizen suit provision would
"extend[] the concept of public participation to the
enforcement
process."36 If the government failed to act, citizen suit sections would
provide an alternate means of enforcement.
In 1970, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to include section
304, a citizen suit provision. 37 This first private enforcement clause was
enacted just a few months after organization of the first Earth Day and
publication of Ralph Nader's landmark report, Vanishing Air.38 The
combative and aggressive tone of the report reveals the intense atmosphere
in which the private citizen suit developed. 39 A belief that neither the
federal government nor the states were enforcing antipollution laws
adequately was widespread.
The legislative histories of the amendments to the Clean Air Act
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act' indicate substantial doubt
about effective governmental enforcement of environmental statutes. The
Senate Report on the Clean Air Act of 1970 recognized the limited
effectiveness of existing statutory devices and expressed the hope that
actions under section 304 would "motivate governmental agencies charged
with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement
proceedings. '4 ' The Senate Report on the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act disclosed an even greater degree of desperation, as it stated,
"[tihe record shows an almost total lack of enforcement., 42 The version

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
116 Cong. Rec. 32, 903 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
38. J. Espos1To, VANIsHiNG AIR (1970).
39. In his introduction to the book, Nader charged that "air pollution (and its fallout on
soil and water) is a form of domestic chemical and biological warfare.... Violators are
openly flouting the laws, and an Administration allegedly dedicated to law and order sits
on its duties." Nader, Introduction to J. Esposito, supra note 38, at viii.
40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1345, 1361-1376 (1988) ("Clean Water Act").
41. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970).
42. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
34.
35.
36.
37.
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of the law existing at the time of the 1972 amendments required a number
of conferences and hearings before the initiation of any enforcement
action. The report noted that the process was so slow and cumbersome
43
that only one case had made it to the courts in over twenty years.
Debate on the proposal divided those who believed that the citizen
suit provision was the only answer to the enforcement agencies'
unavoidable shortage of sufficient resources to confront all statutory
violations, and those who felt that such legislation would increase the
strain on the already over-burdened court system. Although it was
politically difficult to oppose what was viewed as a pro-environmental
proposal, there was considerable congressional concern over giving private
parties the power to enforce regulatory statutes. In the end, Congress
provided citizens with a right to sue that could be exercised only after
notifying the appropriate regulatory agencies and giving them the
opportunity to sue first.44 Citizens were entitled to sue to redress
statutory violations but could not sue for resulting damages.45 In an
effort to encourage private enforcement, Congress permitted citizens to
collect attorneys fees.' At the same time, Congress included a device to
the power to
discourage frivolous and harassing suits by giving courts
47
appropriate.1
"where
party
any
make fee awards against
All new federal environmental legislation or major amendments
thereto except for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
48 have incorporated the citizen suit clause, firmly established
(FIFRA)
and tested in section 304 of the Clean Air Act. The language in each
provision is substantially the same. Generally, the citizen suit provisions
authorize "any person" to initiate an action to enforce the statutory
requirements against "any person" alleged to be in violation or against the
government to compel performance of nondiscretionary duties.49 Federal

43. Id.
44. Clean Air Act § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
45. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).

46. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988).
47. The United States Supreme Court held in Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680, 694 (1983), that for an award to be considered "appropriate" under this language,
a party must have attained "some degree of success on the merits."
48. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
49. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988); Toxic
Substances Control Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 § 310(a), 42 U.S.C.
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district courts have jurisdiction to decide citizen suits regardless of
diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy. Venue is typically in the
district where the violation occurred. In suits against the government,
venue is sometimes in the District of Columbia. 50 The laws bar a citizen
from commencing the action until a period of time has elapsed, usually
sixty days, following the giving of notice to the alleged violator, the EPA,
and sometimes the state. Exceptions to the time delay requirement apply
where plaintiffs claim violations of new source or hazardous pollutant
standards.51 A citizen enforcement action may not be initiated if EPA,
or in some cases the state, has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action to require compliance. 2 Finally, the typical citizen suit section has
a savings clause which eliminates any suggestion that it precludes other
common law or statutory remedies.53
IV.

STANDING TO SUE

A citizen suit defendant may challenge the plaintiffs standing to
prosecute the action. At issue in a challenge to standing is whether the
court has jurisdiction to entertain a particular action; the court does not
address the merits of the claim. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
focus is "on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court
and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."'
Standing requirements derive from two sources, constitutional and
prudential. 55 If a party lacks constitutional standing, the court does not
have the authority to decide the case. Article III, clause 2 of the United
States Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction to resolve "cases" or
"controversies." Courts do not have the resources to rule on theoretical
questions or even concrete questions in which the parties have only an
abstract interest. The plaintiff must have a sufficient interest in the
resolution of the case to meet the constitutional requirements for standing.
Specifically, the plaintiff must satisfy the three-part test established in

§ 9659(a) (1988).
50. E.g., RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C § 6972(a) (1988).
51. E.g., Clean Water Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988).
52. E.g., Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1988).
53. See, e.g., RCRA § 7002(0, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1988); Clean Water Act § 505(0,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(0 (1988); Clean Air Act § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988).
54. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation for Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982), citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
55. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 2d
§ 3531 (1984).
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Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separationfor
The plaintiff must "'show that [1] he . . . has
Church and State.
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant' 57 and [2] that the injury 'can be [fairly]
traced to the challenged action' and [3] 'is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."' 58
The most important and most complex prong is the injury
requirement. Courts will deny standing unless the plaintiff can show
injury to an identifiable interest which the courts will recognize. The
injury must be concrete, whether actual or threatened, in order to give it
the structure required for judicial resolution. The Supreme Court has held
that an interest which is held in common by all members of the public
may not form the basis for standing, because an injury shared by all is
necessarily too abstract.59 Injury to such a widespread interest must
represent more than a generalized grievance pervasively shared, and best
addressed in the elected branches. "[T]he requirement of concrete injury
further serves the function of insuring that such adjudication does not take
place unnecessarily. ' 60
When the statute allegedly violated does not contain a citizen suit
provision, the APA imposes an additional requirement that the plaintiff's
injury be arguably within the "zone of interests" intended to be protected
by the statutory or constitutional provision he invokes.61 This test first
appeared in Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp in which the
Court granted standing to firms engaged in data processing services to
challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's ruling that permitted national
banks to provide such services to other banks and to bank customers.62
The increased competition satisfied the injury in fact requirement. 63 The
Court found the competitors' activities to be "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional

56. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
57. Id. at472 (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979)).
58. Id. at 472 (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38,
41(1976)).

59. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
60. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1973).
61. The APA grants standing to person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of the relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). See, Data Processing Service Org. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
62. 397 U.S. at 151.
63. Id. at 152.
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guarantee in question,"' because the restrictions on bank service
corporation activities specified in section 4 of the Bank Service
Corporation Act protected the competitors' interests.6'
Courts also refuse to find standing when a plaintiff fails to prove
a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action. In
Warth v. Seldin, residents challenged a town zoning ordinance as violating
their constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983.' The
residents claimed that the ordinance effectively excluded low income
persons from living in the town. 67 In denying standing, the Court
established a "but for" standard requiring a fairly high level of specificity
for showing a causal link between the alleged injury and the challenged
act. The court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts from
which the court could reasonably infer that, absent the town's restrictive
zoning practices, there was a substantial probability that the plaintiffs
would be able to purchase or lease housing in the community.68
Finally, a court will deny standing where a plaintiff asserts an
injury held in common by all members of the public.69 Courts find an
injury shared by all citizens too abstract to be capable of judicial
resolution. Instead, courts hold that the elected branches can best address
questions of such widespread impact.7" Judicial intervention is reserved
for protection of individual rights. The Supreme Court has stated,
"Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened . . . adds the essential
dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining
party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as
unlawful.'
Absent such a specific injury, courts believe it unwise to
accord standing.
This requirement does not mean, however, that a group can never
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 155-56.
422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975).
Id.

68. Id. at 504.
69. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974), in
which plaintiffs, a group of present and past Air Force reservists opposing U.S.

involvement in Vietnam brought a class action on behalf, inter alia, of all U.S. citizens
and taxpayers against the Secretary of Defense challenging the Reserve membership of
members of Congress as violating the Incompatibility Clause of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 of the
Constitution.
70. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church

and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-474 (1982).
71. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208, 220-221.
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establish proper standing to challenge an action. Citizen organizations
often file citizen suits, sometimes on behalf of themselves, sometimes on
behalf of their members. An organization itself may have standing to
request judicial relief from injury to itself and to seek protection of
whatever rights it may enjoy.72 The organization itself need not have
suffered injury as a result of the challenged activity to have standing to
assert the claims of its members.73 The question of organizational
standing frequently involves a consideration of the concept of third party
standing, that is, standing of one party to sue on behalf of another. 74 An
association has representational standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit. "
V. THE INJURY IN FACT REQUIREMENT IN PRE-NATONAL WILDUFE

FEDERATION CASES

Courts traditionally require plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits
to make a lesser showing to obtain standing than the showing they require
in cases not involving environmental issues. In a decision reflecting
deference to a congressional mandate favoring environmental interests, the
Supreme Court has held that statutory grants of standing in environmental
cases supplant the Court's own prudential restrictions on such elements as
the widespread nature of the injury.76
Courts have not demanded proof of injury to economic interests in
order to establish standing in environmental citizen suits. In the landmark
case of Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs
who assert and are able to show harm to aesthetic or environmental
The
interests meet the requirement of actual or threatened injury.'

72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
73. Id.
74. See generally Marc Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of
Third-Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393,
430-33 (1981).
75. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

76. Michael A.Perino, Comment, Justice Scalia: Standing, EnvironmentalLaw, and the
Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 144 (1987).
77. 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
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Court, however, restricted its grant of standing in such cases to those
plaintiffs who can demonstrate that they themselves have suffered or will
suffer the injury claimed.7"
The plaintiff in Morton was an environmental interest organization
suing under section 10 of the APA to obtain a declaratory judgment and
an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving a vast skiing
development in the Sequoia National Forest's Mineral King Valley.7 9
The Court recognized injury to a cognizable interest, destruction of or
other adverse effects to the park's "scenery, natural and historical objects,
and wildlife and impairment of the enjoyment of the park for future
generations.""0 Because the organization never asserted that its members
actually used Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, however, the Court
held that the Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be
affected in any of their activities by the proposed development."
In
order to establish standing, a party must show more than a "mere interest
in a problem. '8 2 The alleged injury in fact was not sufficiently
personalized to meet the injury in fact requirement. The Court suggested
a simple remedy for this basically procedural flaw, submission of the
affidavits of the organizational plaintiff's members stating that they use the
resource at issue and that the proposed agency action would adversely
affect their enjoyment thereof.8 3
Relaxing the prerequisites for standing in environmental litigation,
the Court gave the injury in fact requirement a broad interpretation in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP) by refusing to deny standing simply because the injury asserted
would have an impact on a large number of people.8 In SCRAP, the
plaintiffs, an unincorporated association of five law students, filed an APA
section 10(a) complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of Interstate
Commerce Commission orders approving a railroad rate increase that
placed a surcharge on the transportation of scrap materials.8 " The
plaintiffs claimed that this rate modification encouraged the use of raw
materials over recycled materials, thereby causing an increase in pollution
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

735-36.
730.
735.
736.
739.
735-36 n.8.

84. 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973).
85. Id. at 678.
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and injuring the students as users of natural resources and breathers of
air." Although the Court recognized that the injury at issue was far less
direct and perceptible than that asserted in Morton, it found that "standing
is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury." '
The Court found that SCRAP had sufficiently alleged in their pleadings
that its members were "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" under section
10(a) of the APA by submitting affidavits stating that its "members used
the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the Washington
metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that
this use was disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the
nonuse of recyclable goods brought about by a rate increase on those
commodities."88 These allegations of "a specific and perceptible harm"
sufficiently distinguished SCRAP members from other citizens who had
not used the natural resources at issue. 9
VI. LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

In July 1985, the National Wildlife Federation ("NWF"), a 4.5
million member environmental public interest organization, brought an
action against the United States Department of the Interior ("Department"),
the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), and the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM"). 90 NWF contested a Department decision to

86. In describing SCRAP's injury in fact, the Court stated,
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to
pay more for finished products, that each of its members [u]ses the
forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources
surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area and at his legal
residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other
recreational [and] aesthetic purposes, and... that each of its members
breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and the area
of his legal residence and that this air has suffered increased pollution

caused by the modified rate structure, and that each member has been
forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums which must be
expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials.
Id. at 678.
87. Id. at 687.
88. Id. at 685.
89. Id. at 689.
90. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989); See National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985).
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reclassify the status of 180 million acres of public land located in
seventeen states. 91 As part of its ongoing "Land Withdrawal Review
Program ("Program")," the Department decided to lift protective
restric.ions on the use of the land at issue.92 The Department instituted
this program pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
("FLPMA"). 93 FLPMA directs the Secretary to prepare and maintain an
"inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values," 94 and
to develop and maintain land use plans for public lands." In addition,
FLPMA allows the Secretary to review and "modify or terminate" land use
classifications."
As an Interior subagency, the BLM is responsible for implementing
the Program. 97 Pursuant to the Program, BLM terminated land use
"withdrawals" and "classifications," devices through which the Department
"implement[ed] land use planning for millions of acres of federal public
lands."98 The Department utilized "classifications" to categorize lands for
specific usage, often designating public lands for retention, thereby
removing them from the reach of various land disposal laws. 99
"Withdrawals" enabled the BLM to remove directly designated public
lands from disposal under the general laws.'0°
By terminating the classifications and withdrawals, the BLM
effectively lifted protective restrictions, thereby opening over 13 million
acres of federal land to mining by private parties.'0 1 When NWF filed
suit, hundreds of leases and sales, executed and pending, had resulted in
land uses such as mining and mineral leasing as well as agricultural,
commercial and other proposed developmental uses."0
In its amended complaint, NWF claimed the defendants had
violated the FLMPA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
91. 878 F.2d at 425.
92. Id.
93. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982). In enacting the FLPMA in 1976, Congress
established a policy favoring retention of public lands for multiple use management.
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 877 (1990).
94. 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1982).
95. § 1712(a).
96. § 1712(d).
97. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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("NEPA"), °3 and section 10 of the APA in the course of administering
the Program.' °4 NWF alleged that the reclassification of some of the
withdrawn lands and the return of others to public domain would destroy
their natural beauty through mining activities. °5 Specifically, NWF
claimed that the defendants had neglected their duties under the FLMPA
by failing to "develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use
plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of public lands."1 "°
NWF further alleged that the defendants had violated NEPA by failing to
Finally, NWF asserted
prepare an environmental impact statement."
that all of defendants' violations were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" and that the court
should set aside these actions pursuant to section 10 of the APA.208
At trial, NWF offered affidavits of two of its members in support
of its standing to sue."° The individuals alleged that they used federal
land "in the vicinity of' the areas affected by the Program and that the
defendants' actions adversely affected their recreational and aesthetic
The district court granted
enjoyment of the federal land at issue."
NWF's motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the defendants
from reclassifying or modifying the revocation status of the lands at issue,
and denied the defendants' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.'
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
issuance of a preliminary injunction but sustained the denial of the
On remand, the defendants again
defendants' motion to dismiss."
contested NWF's standing by moving for summary judgment, which
The Court of Appeals reversed,
motion the district court granted.1
holding that one of the affidavits was ambiguous with respect to whether
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1982).
104. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 875 (1990).

105. Id. at 879.
106. Id. (referring to 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982)).
107. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982)).
108. Id. (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982)).

109. Id. at 880.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 879-80. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277, 279
(D.D.C. 1985).
112. 497 U.S. at 880; See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
113. 497 U.S. at 881; See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332
(D.D.C. 1988).
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the adversely affected lands were actually the ones the affiant used." 4
The appellate court determined that the district court should have resolved
the factual ambiguity of the affidavit in the NWF's favor by assuming that
the affiant had in fact used all of the land at issue. 5
The defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari which the Court granted." 6 By a five to four vote, the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed the Court of Appeals by refusing
to find standing.!" The Court found that the affidavits alleged "adverse
affect" or "aggrievement" which was "within the meaning of the relevant
statute," that is, which satisfied the "zone of interests" test." 8 The Court
held that recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment were among the sorts of
interests that the statutes which formed the basis of the complaint, the
FLMPA and NEPA, attempted to protect." 9 The Court found that the
affidavits failed to show that the interests of the affiants were "actually
affected" by the specific agency actions challenged, however. 20
Summary judgment was proper because the individuals failed to
demonstrate that their use and enjoyment of federal land extended to the
particular land at issue.' 2 ' NWF merely made general averments, but did
not the assert "specific facts" required to withstand a motion for summary
judgment."
VII. IMPACT OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION'S INJURY IN FACT

REQUIREMENT

After National Wildlife Federation,courts will require facts alleging
use and enjoyment of an area more specific than land "in the vicinity" of
the challenged conduct. The courts will not infer this factual prerequisite
for standing. Practically speaking, however, the decision has limited
implications for plaintiffs seeking standing in environmental citizen suits.
Essentially, the decision stands for the proposition that a challenge
to a plaintiff's standing in an environmental citizen suit will likely be more
114. 497 U.S. at 881; See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C.

Cir. 1989).
115. 878 F.2d at 431.
116. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 889.

121. Id.

122. Id.
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effective if the defendant uses a motion for summary judgment rather than
a motion to dismiss. The stricter requirement articulated in the decision
is not new to standing doctrine in environmental litigation. In SCRAP, the
Court seemed to relax the requirement in its grant of standing to the
plaintiffs based on their attenuated "but for" allegations "that a railroad rate
increase would cause use of nonrecyclable commodities, which would in
turn divert natural resources out of the area and into the manufacturing
process, which would in turn cause more litter in the parks used by
plaintiffs.'02
In National Wildlife Federation, however, the Court
distinguished the expansive holding in SCRAP by noting that the latter
case involved a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, not a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment." Unlike a motion for summary judgment, a Rule
12(b) motion "presumes that general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim."' 5 No such inference
exists with respect to a motion for summary judgment. In other words, in
contesting a Rule 12(b) motion, the nonmoving party need only allege
facts sufficiently specific to meet the requirements for standing, while the
party responding to a summary judgment motion must submit substantive
evidence, usually affidavits, to support the specific allegations set forth in
the complaint.
In the context of environmental citizen suits, plaintiffs will have to
be more careful and thorough in drafting their allegations and presenting
their evidence in support of standing. In suits regarding land areas, the
Court's emphasis on geographical specificity will require plaintiffs to be
more specific about the areas of land they use and enjoy, and about the
ways in which the challenged conduct adversely affects such use and
enjoyment.
If any lasting standing implications for environmental citizen suit
plaintiffs exist, they are (1) the Court's reaffirmation of the actual injury
prerequisite and its application of the requirement to suits involving land
areas, and (2) the Court's recognition that recreational use and enjoyment
of federal land are among the sorts of interests that NEPA was specifically

123. Daniel J. Capra, DiscretionMust Be Controlled,JudicialAuthority Circumscribed,
Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified:
Recent Supreme Court Contributionsto FederalCivil Practice,50 MD. L. REV. 632, 677

(1991).
124. 497 U.S. at 889.
125. Id., (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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intended to protect."
The requirement of geographical specificity is another way of
articulating the requirement of actual injury. In Lujan the Court found the
affidavits defective because the individuals merely claimed use and
enjoyment of land "in the vicinity" of the area of the proposed
development. The Court then held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate
that their use and enjoyment of the "particular" lands at issue were
"actually" affected by the agency action.
Post-NationalWildlife Federationorganizational plaintiffs will find
themselves confronted by stricter standing requirements imposed by these
new standards. In Save Ourselves v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,'2 7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied National Wildlife
Federationto deny standing to a non-profit association suing the Corps for
failure to comply with the APA and exercise its Clean Water Act
jurisdiction in determining whether a tract of land to be developed by
airport authorities was a wetland. The plaintiff, an organization dedicated
to protecting and preserving the waters of Ascension Parish, Louisana,
claimed that it was "adversely affected or aggrieved by the Corps'
abrogation of its duty to declare the airport site a wetland under the Clean
Water Act. '121 The court held that because the plaintiff failed to submit
affidavits or other evidence demonstrating that the Corps' actions affected
its members, it did not "allege specific facts showing a direct injury to any
of its members sufficient to confer standing" under section 702 of the
129
APA.
The Supreme Court also denied standing to environmental
conservation organizations who failed to allege sufficient injury in fact in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 30 The plaintiffs challenged a regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior which made section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 inapplicable to actions in foreign
countries.'
Section 7 requires federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to ensure that any action funded by

126. See, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991)
(in which the court, citing National Wildlife Federation,found that recreational use and
aesthetic enjoyment were among the sorts of interests that NEPA purports to protect).
127. 958 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1992).
128. Id. at 661.
129. Id. at 662.
130. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
131. Id. at 2135.
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the government is not likely to jeopardize endangered species.
Although members of the organization claimed to have travelled to foreign
countries in the past to observe endangered species and asserted that they
intended to return to those places, the Court concluded that such averments
were not sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.1 3 3 The
plaintiffs had to demonstrate concrete plans or specific dates for travel." 4
The plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildife also asserted that they had
standing based on an "ecosystem nexus. 135 This theory proposed that
any person who uses any part of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversely
affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a
great distance away. 136 The Court rejected this theory as inconsistent
did not use the
with National Wildlife Federation because the plaintiffs
37
action.
challenged
the
by
affected
particular area
Other plaintiffs have successfully met the standing requirements.
In Sierra Club v. Robertson,1 31 the court applied National Wildlife
Federationin a suit brought by an organizational plaintiff challenging the
United States Forest Service's adoption of a land and resource
management plan for the Ouachita National Forest in Arkansas. The court
held that the allegations of injury in affidavits submitted by the plaintiff's
members were sufficiently specific to enable the court to find
standing. 139 "Plaintiffs' affidavits here . . .describe in detail specific
parts of the forest that the affiants enjoy, activities that they engage in
there, and the types of harm that they allege ensue from the use of
,,14'
These are the
herbicides and even aged management techniques .
sorts of area-specific allegations contemplated by the Court in National
Wildlife Federationthat permit standing. The district court found that the
problem of specificity at issue in National Wildlife Federation did not
were
present an obstacle in this case and that the plaintiff's affidavits
1 41
"aggrievement.
of
sufficient to meet the APA's requirement
The federal district court for the District of Columbia used the

132. Id.

133. Id. at 2138.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2139.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.Ark. 1991).

139. Id. at 552-53.
140. Id. at 552.

141. Id. at 553.

122

WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 17:103

holding in National Wildife Federationto find that a corporate shipholding
group had standing to sue under NEPA on behalf of its employees to
contest the Maritime Administration's promulgation of a rule allowing very
large crude tankers to operate in domestic trade without completing a full
environmental impact statement ("EIS"). 142 The plaintiff asserted that the
enactment of the rule without performing a full EIS created a risk of air
and water pollution in the areas in which the company and its employees
conducted business. 143 The court found that evidence showing that the
plaintiff "uses the affected sea lanes, and would be aggrieved should there
be an oil spill, collision or increased air pollution" was adequately specific
44
'
to meet National Wildife Federation'sgeographical nexus requirement.
VIII. CONCLUSION

NationalWildlife Federation'sinjury in fact requirement represents
a limited contribution to standing jurisprudence in the area of
environmental litigation. The opinion does little more than reaffirm the
standing doctrine established by the Court in prior decisions. If the case
further defines standing, it does so only to the extent that it applies the
actual injury prerequisite to cases involving land areas and recognizes that
recreational use and enjoyment of federal land are among the sorts of
interests NEPA was specifically designed to protect.
The Court's procedural requirements and implicit suggestions
contain the real implications of the decision for parties to environmental
citizen suits. Plaintiffs, both individual and organizational, seeking to
invoke the right to sue statutorily, but not unconditionally, granted to them,
must be more careful and artful in articulating their claims and drafting
their supporting affidavits. Specifically, plaintiffs must aver use and
enjoyment of the affected land itself. Claimed use and enjoyment of land
"in the vicinity" of the affected area will not suffice. Finally, defendants
contesting a citizen suit are well-advised to move for summary judgment
rather than dismissal under Rule 12(b). Courts will take a closer look at
a plaintiff's allegations when considering a motion for summary judgment
and will demand a higher degree of specificity with respect to the injury
alleged and the challenged action.

142. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. v. Skinner, 767 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D.D.C. 1991).
143. Id.
144. Id.

